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ABSTRACT
As human beings we are bound up with the medical profession. It is certain that at some 
point in our life we rely on their help. Even if such help is avoided throughout life, some life 
activities involve recourse to medical care. 
During the exercise of its activity the medical profession is faced with many ethical dilemmas, 
where the solution is not in the law, where choice and decision making become difficult 
in terms of ethics and where they must rely on their values and judgments. That’s why the 
involvement of the medical profession in everyone’s lives makes the understanding of the 
law governing the medical profession extremely important. Patient rights are part of human 
rights. 
This article’s aim is to present one important patient right - the right to die. Whilst is accepted 
the increasing role of the medical profession in determining the shape of the law in medical 
care, this article focuses on understanding how different courts deal with cases involving the 
right to die. The article offers a framework on patient’s right to die in the United States of 
America, Europe, United Kingdom and Albania.
Key words: assisted suicide, case law, euthanasia, right to die, right to life, physician
* Correspondence address: Gentian Vyshka, Faculty of Medicine, University of Tirana, Albania, e-mail: gvyshka@
yahoo.com
136
JAHR  Vol. 5  No. 9  2014
1. Is there a right to die?
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.1 As Abraham Lincoln, 
speaking in Baltimore in 1864 said, the understanding of rights, life and liberty is 
different for different people.2 
The right to die raises many difficult questions in medical care: What is the right to 
life? When life, and therefore the right to protection of life by law, begin or end? 
May, or must, the state protect the right to life even of a person who does not want 
to live any longer, against that person’s own wishes? Is it acceptable to provide 
palliative care to a terminally ill or dying person, even if the treatment may, as a 
side-effect, contribute to the shortening of the patient’s life? Should the patient be 
consulted on this? Do people have, not just a right to life and to live but also a right 
to die as and when they choose? Do they have the right to decide on what they 
consider to be a “good death”3? Can they seek assistance from others to end their 
lives? Can the state allow the ending of life in order to end suffering, even if the 
person concerned cannot express his or her wishes in this respect?
The answer to such questions might be easier in cases arising by requests of mentally 
fit patients, who request to die as they’re unable to commit suicide themselves. The 
situation is very different in cases of patients who cannot express their opinions as 
are patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). In such cases the question that 
arises is whether they too have a right to die.4 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the ‘right to die’ as ‘pertaining to, expressing, 
or advocating the right to refuse extraordinary measures intended to prolong 
someone’s life when they are terminally ill or comatose.’5 Such right includes issues 
1 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 727.
2 <http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/Speech_is_of_Time/print/403_Freedom.pdf> accessed 
14.11.2012.         
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as his liberator, 
while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one’.
3 The word ‘euthanasia’ derives from the Greek language meaning ‘a good death’, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Euthanasia> [accessed 04.03.2013].
4 Death is defined in Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary as ‘the state of being dead; extinction or cessation 
of life’, <http://archive.org/stream/chambersstwentie00daviiala/chambersstwentie00daviiala_djvu.txt>, accessed 
18.03.2013. Steadman’s Medical Dictionary adds to this ‘in multicellular organisms, death is a gradual process at 
the cellular level with tissues varying in their ability to withstand deprivation of oxygen’, <http://www.drugs.com/
dict/death.html> accessed 18.03.2013. A proper definition of death comes from United States’ Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act 1980 which, in essence, states that an individual who has sustained either: (1) irreversible 
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or; (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is considered dead.
5 <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/right-to-die?q=right-to-die>, accessed 27.02.2013.
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of suicide, active euthanasia (the deliberate action to hasten death), passive 
euthanasia (allowing a person to die by refusal or withdrawal of medical 
intervention), assisted suicide (providing a person the means of committing suicide), 
and palliative care (providing comfort care which accelerates the death process).
It is impossible to talk about a right to die without considering the acts or omissions 
of the physician. It’s obvious that if a family member, friend or relative helps 
someone die, in the comfort of their own house, they will definitely face prosecution. 
The situation changes in medical care. Obviously it would be easy for the state to 
ban any sort of assistance from doctors to help their patients to release suffering and 
pain, and sanction punishment by law to any doctor that would commit such 
actions. But then, when talking about patients that can not commit suicide 
themselves, would such actions be considered as state interference on their right to 
put an end to their life? Is there such right?
A person may decide to end his or her life not only actively, i.e. committing suicide, 
but also passively such as refusing life saving treatment, food and water. However, 
even in such situations the possibility remains that another person will get involved, 
not to assist in suicide, but to make dying comfortable and painless. Terminally ill 
people or those unable to commit suicide themselves rely on their doctors to give an 
end to their lives. 
Doctors have a duty of care which consists on diagnosing, treating and advising. 
These obligations are both moral and legal. Treatment ordinarily aims to benefit a 
patient through preserving life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting against 
disability, and returning maximally effective functioning.6 A doctor’s duty of care is 
to take reasonable steps (as other reasonable doctors would) to save or prolong life 
or to act in the patient’s best interests.7 Although in most instances doctors would 
prescribe the drug for the purpose of pain relief, it is arguable that at times, they 
may in fact do so to assist their patients to put an end to their suffering.
When deciding on end-of-life cases judges are faced with some really important 
questions: Do terminally ill persons have a right to avoid both “severe physical pain” 
and “the despair and distress that comes from physical deterioration and the 
inability to control basic bodily and mental functions”?8 Is a liberty interest 
implicated when the state blocks a person from seeking relief from severe pain or 
suffering? Is there a right to die?
6 James J. Walter, Thomas Anthony Shannon, The Quality of Life: The New Medical Dilemma, Paulist Press 1990, 
p.305.
7 <http://www.respectingpatientchoices.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42&Item
id=43>, accessed 26.02.2013. 
8 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
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There are two distinctive views of the right to die: the right to die as a negative right, 
which requires a duty of non-interference9 and calls for non action from others; and 
the right to die as a positive right, which entails not only a duty of non-interference, 
but also “the duty to help, at least in the cases where the right-holder would not be 
able to do the thing without help”10.
In order to benefit from the existing negative right to die, one must be competent to 
make a decision. Further to this, the person should be physically able to carry out 
the act of suicide. Therefore, a person contemplating suicide should begin and end 
the whole process by oneself. Any sort of assistance provided either ‘before the fact’, 
‘during the process of attempt to commit suicide’ or ‘after the attempt’, would 
potentially render the assistant an offender and subject to prosecution. 
Some judges are in favor of protecting the right to die, assisted suicide and voluntary 
euthanasia, while other focus on state’s interest in the protection of life. For those 
who support this right, it is tempting to argue that the court should recognize the 
right as fundamental and, under traditional fundamental rights jurisprudence, 
effectively stop all infringements. The problem with such an approach is that to do 
so would undervalue the state’s legitimate interest in preserving life in all forms 
when a state chooses to adopt a pro-life policy. The policy that must be adopted 
must balance these two interests so that they may coexist to the fullest extent 
possible.11 
There is though, arguably, a “‘right to die with dignity,”’ which includes as one of its 
core aspects a right to avoid “unnecessary and severe physical suffering.”12 A 
successful claim to assisted suicide would require a showing of a need to avoid 
“severe physical pain,” and any physical pain can be avoided with either pain control 
medications or “sedation which can end in a coma”. Faced with the argument that 
assisted suicide is the only way to respond to the severe suffering of some dying 
patients, the courts have observed that these patients can turn to the alternative of 
terminal sedation.13 However, terminal sedation is essentially a form of euthanasia.
9 Childress J.F., ‘Negative and Positive Rights’, The Hastings Center Report, (1980) Vol. 10, No.1, p 19; R 
(Pretty) v DPP (Secretary of State for the Home Department intervening) [2002] 1 A.C. 800, p 846. 
10 Prema S Matker, Analyzing Restrictive and Approaches towards Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, p 17, <https://qmro.
qmul.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/504/1/MATKERAnalysingRestrictive2010.pdf> accessed 28.02.2013.  
11 Michael P. Allen, ‘The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death: A Suggested Approach to Accommo-
date an Interest in Life and a Right to Die’ [2011]. 
< http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=aulr> accessed 23.01.2013.
12 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110), p 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
13 Vacco v. Quill  - 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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Many are of the opinion that withdrawal of life sustaining treatment on patients in a 
persistent vegetative state is also another form of euthanasia. One possible justification 
for distinguishing between euthanasia and withdrawal of life sustaining treatment is the 
distinction between acts and omissions, or between killing and letting die. Treatment 
withdrawal, which indubitably involves doctors doing something, is a good example of 
conduct which lies on the boundary between acts and omissions, because it could easily 
be described as an action. It is by taking into account the surrounding circumstances, 
and not by labeling what the doctor does as an omission, that we can ascertain whether 
his conduct is acceptable. The morally relevant fact is not whether what the doctor does 
is an omission or an action, but rather whether the background against which the 
decision has been taken justifies the doctor’s conclusion that life, in these circumstances, 
should not be artificially prolonged.14 Certainly there are cases where refusal of 
treatment is motivated by the desire to avoid a continued life of suffering and other 
cases where it is only the treatment itself the individual seeks to avoid. 
While deciding on right-to-die cases, the courts have emphasized the distinction 
between withdrawal of life sustaining treatment and suicide assistance. Withdrawal 
of life sustaining treatment is permitted because the patient dies from the underlying 
disease, not from the active intervention of the physician. 15
Opening the door to assisted suicide for terminally ill persons could pose too great a 
risk of suicide for persons who are not competent, who are not terminally ill, whose 
desire for suicide would abate with treatment for mental depression or with 
validation from others of the value of their life, or who are vulnerable to influence 
by family members and physicians concerned with the financial and psychological 
burdens of caring for the patient, nevertheless it is working for the Netherlands.16 
14 Memorandum by Professor Emily Jackson, Chair of Medical Law, Queen Mary, University of London. <http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/86we13.htm> [accessed 03.07.2012].
15 David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing Eutha-
nasia, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2028321 > p 959.
 Although treatment withdrawal is typically distinguished from euthanasia in terms of the objective component of 
intent, terminal sedation and euthanasia cannot be differentiated on that basis. Treatment withdrawal is distinguished 
from euthanasia because with the former, the physician might reasonably believe that the patient will survive the 
discontinuation of treatment. The physician may have misjudged either the patient’s dependence on the treatment, 
or the chances that the patient’s condition would improve.” Because it is possible for treatment to be withdrawn and 
for the patient to survive, we can say that the physician only intends to free the patient from an unwanted treatment. 
We cannot make a parallel argument for euthanasia. Because euthanasia will relieve the patient’s suffering only by 
killing the patient, the physician cannot reasonably intend for the patient not die. In terms of this distinction between 
treatment withdrawal and euthanasia, terminal sedation falls on the euthanasia side of the line. 
16 Articles 293 and 294 of the Dutch Penal Code make both euthanasia and assisted suicide illegal, even today. 
However, as the result of various court cases, doctors who directly kill patients or help patients kill themselves will 
not be prosecuted as long as they follow certain guidelines. In addition to the current requirements physicians must 
report every euthanasia/assisted-suicide death to the local prosecutor and that the patient’s death request must be 
enduring (carefully considered and requested on more than one occasion).
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The majority of individuals and countries are of the opinion that … “Legalization 
of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia would “undermine the trust that is 
essential to the doctor-patient relationship” because physicians would be causers of 
death as well as healers of illness.17 A right to assisted suicide for the terminally ill 
inevitably leads society down the slippery slope to assisted suicide for patients, who 
are not terminally ill.18 Once we permit assisted suicide for some persons, we will 
have no principle for denying it to other persons who claim great suffering.”19
Even though the majorities of states worldwide do not accept and ban any form of 
assisted suicide, when it comes to decision-making the judges, themselves, are of 
different opinions. As a result it is very difficult to have a sharp opinion whether 
accept some sort of assisted suicide or be against any such form.
2. International and Albanian case law on the right to die
the case-law of many countries on the right to die is of a very large number. The 
legal system of different countries is different. National laws of individual countries 
are shaped by the history, community values, economics, culture, religious 
orientation, current predominant legal philosophy, etc. Countries such as The 
United States of America (USA), The United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Australia, 
etc. have common law systems in which the law is based on judge-made precedents 
as well as legislation. Meanwhile countries such as Italy, France, Albania, etc. base 
their activities primarily on national civil and criminal codes, though their higher 
courts do make authoritative rulings on the law. National laws of members of the 
European Union are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).
2.1. United States of America case law
In the United States the process of dying underwent far reaching changes in the 
mid- and late-20th century, creating difficult ethical issues for doctors and patients, 
and eventually, for judges and legislators. The professionalization of the practice of 
medicine combined with advances in public health and medical technology to 
change the when, the where and the how of the dying process. The new technology 
often was seen as merely prolonging the dying process, leading some patients and 
families to ask courts and legislatures to recognize a ‘right to die’. 
17 ibid. (n 12) p 2273.
18 ibid.  p 2273-74.
19 ibid. (n 15) p 964.
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A right to die was introduced in America since 1906 when the first euthanasia bill, 
which did not succeed, was drafted in Ohio. In the mid 1960’s began right to die 
movements.20
20 Assisted-suicide is legal in three American states (Oregon, Washington, and Montana).   
In America:  
The right to assisted suicide was recognized in Washington by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in the case Com-
passion in Dying v. State of Washington. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed 
a district court judgment that ruled unconstitutional a Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to 
competent, terminally ill adults who wish to obtain prescription medication to hasten their deaths. The statute, 
which was challenged by a group of patients, physicians, and the nonprofit organization Compassion in Dying, was 
held to be unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court took into 
consideration the interests of the state in protecting life, preventing suicides, preventing undue, arbitrary, or unfair 
influences on an individual’s decision to end his life, and ensuring the integrity of the medical profession. These 
interests were balanced against an individual’s strong liberty interest in determining how and when one’s life should 
end. The court recognized this interest after assessing the growing public support for assisted suicide, changes in the 
causes of death and medical advances, and Supreme Court cases addressing due process liberty interests. The court 
then determined that the state’s interest, which could be protected by adopting sufficient safeguards, did not outweigh 
the severe burden placed on the terminally ill, and thus the statute as applied was unconstitutional.  
In Oregon such right was recognized in the case Gonzales v. Oregon (Docket # 04-623 Jan. 17, 2006). In 1994, 
Oregon passed the Death with Dignity Act (passed by referendum on 9 November 1994), the first state law per-
mitting physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that the Act violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, and threatened 
to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who engaged in physician-assisted suicide. Oregon sued the Attorney 
General in federal district court. The district court and the Ninth Circuit both held that Ashcroft’s directive was 
illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion, also held that the Controlled Substances Act did not authorize 
the Attorney General to ban the use of controlled substances for physician-assisted suicide. “The CSA [Controlled 
Substances Act] does not allow the Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use 
in physician-assisted suicide under state law permitting the procedure.” “The Attorney General has rulemaking 
power to fulfill his duties under the CSA. The specific respects in which he is authorized to make rules, however, 
instruct us that he is not authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard for care and treat-
ment of patients that is specifically authorized under state law.” “In the face of the CSA’s silence on the practice 
of medicine generally and its recognition of state regulation of the medical profession it is difficult to defend the 
Attorney General’s declaration that the statute impliedly criminalizes physician-assisted suicide.”  
The right to die was recognized in Montana by the decision of the courts in the case Baxter v. Montana. Baxter 
v. Montana was a Montana Supreme Court case, argued on September 2, 2009, and decided on December 31, 
2009, that addressed the question of whether the state’s constitution guaranteed terminally ill patients a right to 
lethal prescription medication from their physicians. he original lawsuit was brought by 4 Montana physicians 
(Stephen Speckart, C. Paul Loehnen, Lar Autio, and George Risi, Jr., M.D.s), Compassion & Choices and Robert 
Baxter, a 76 year old truck driver from Billings, Montana, who was dying of lymphocytic leukemia. The plaintiffs 
asked the court to establish a constitutional right “to receive and provide aid in dying”. The state argued that “the 
Constitution confers no right to aid in ending one’s life.” Judge Dorothy McCarter, of Montana’s First Judicial 
District Court, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on December 5, 2008, stating that the “constitutional rights of 
individual privacy and human dignity, taken together, encompass the right of a competent terminally-ill patient 
to die with dignity.” Baxter died that same day. The Montana Attorney General appealed the case to the state 
Supreme Court. Oral arguments were heard on September 2, 2009. Amicus briefs filed on behalf of those asking 
the court to grant the constitutional right to receive/provide aid in dying include human rights groups, women’s 
rights groups, The American Medical Women’s Association/American Medical Students Association, clergy, legal 
scholars, 31 Montana state legislators and bioethicists, among others. Among the groups filing amicus briefs on 
behalf of the state are the Alliance Defense Fund on behalf of the Family Research Council, Americans United for 
Life, the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the Catholic Medical Association. 
The Montana Medical Association issued a statement opposing physician-assisted suicide, but has refused to file an 
amicus brief in the appeal. On Dec. 31, 2009, the Montana Supreme Court ruled in favor of Baxter. It stated that, 
while the state’s Constitution did not guarantee a right to physician-assisted suicide, there was “nothing in Mon-
tana Supreme Court precedent or Montana statutes indicating that physician aid in dying is against public policy.”
According to the USA jurisprudence, a competent person has, under the United 
States’ Constitution a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment but, 
according to many US courts’ jurisprudence, the US Constitution does not 
recognize a right to die. 
In 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the decision of the case of Karen 
Ann Quinlan.21 When she was 21, Quinlan became unconscious after arriving home 
from a party. After she collapsed and stopped breathing twice for 15 minutes or 
more, the paramedics arrived and took her to a hospital, where she lapsed into a 
persistent vegetative state and was kept alive on a ventilator. After seeing Karen like 
this for several months, her family finally came to the conclusion that she was 
beyond hope, and decided to remove her from the ventilator. Hospital officials, 
faced with threats from the Morris County prosecutor to bring homicide charges 
against them, joined with the Quinlan family in seeking an appropriate protective 
order from the courts, before allowing the respirator to be removed. The Quinlan 
family persevered, and in 1976 they took their case to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, which ruled in their favor. 
A nationwide controversy over an Indiana couple’s 1982’s decision to refuse possibly 
life-saving surgery for their infant son born with severe disabilities led two years 
later to a federal law prohibiting federally financed hospitals from withholding 
treatment from infants on the basis of disabilities.22
In 1990 USA’s Supreme Court was faced with the case of Nancy Cruzan23, an 
incompetent individual who had sustained severe injuries in an automobile 
accident, and lived in a Missouri state hospital in what was referred to as a persistent 
vegetative state. Cruzan’s parents requested the termination of her artificial 
nutrition, but hospital’s staff refused to honor such request. A state trial court 
authorized the termination, but the State’s Supreme Court reversed. USA’s Supreme 
Court held that most courts have based the right to refuse treatment on the 
common law right to informed consent24 or on both that right and a constitutional 
privacy right25. According to the USA Constitution a competent person has a liberty 
interest, under 14-th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment. 
21 Quinlan v. New Jersey, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
22 Baby Doe v The Prenatal Clinic, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby_Doe_Law>, accessed 1of December 2012. 
23 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
24 Storar v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981).
25 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417.
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In 1997 USA’s Supreme court decided on two cases: Washington v. Glucksberg26 and 
Vacco v. Quill27. In the first case, Dr. Glucksberg, along with two other physicians and 
three gravely ill patients brought suit to overturn a Washington law that made 
“promoting a suicide attempt” a felony, on the grounds that the statute violated a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal district court ruled that the law was 
unconstitutional; a three- judge Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, but 
the full Circuit Court en banc reinstated the district court’s conclusion: that the 
assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional as applied to terminally-ill, competent adults 
who wished to hasten their deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians.
In Vacco v. Quill, as in the first case, suit was brought by three physicians and three 
gravely ill patients, challenging the state law against aiding a suicide attempt. The 
district court found the law constitutional, but a three-judge Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit disagreed, ruling that the prohibition violates the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court’s reasoning was that 
New York law permitted terminally-ill patients to direct the removal of life-
sustaining equipment in order to hasten their death, but did not allow those not 
attached to such equipment to hasten death by self-administering prescribed 
medication. The court felt that this distinction was untenable, and was not rationally 
related to any legitimate state interest. The Supreme Court of USA unanimously 
upheld both the Washington and the New York laws.
Another important case on USA’s Supreme Court jurisprudence was that of Terri 
Schiavo.28 Her case lasted from 1998 to 2005 and involved not only the public and 
the media, but also the then governor J. Bush. Terri collapsed in her St. Petersburg, 
Florida, home in full cardiac arrest on February 25, 1990. She suffered massive 
brain damage due to lack of oxygen and, after two and a half months in a coma, her 
diagnosis was changed to vegetative state. Even though many efforts were made 
during 1990-1993 to rehabilitate her, her appointed guardian ad litem stated that 
there was no hope for Terri. 
In 1998 her husband petitioned to remove her feeding tube. He was opposed by 
Terri’s parents who argued that she was conscious and relied on Terri’s religious 
beliefs to continue life prolonging measures. Her parents claimed that Terri was a 
devout roman catholic who would not wish to violate the church’s teachings on 
euthanasia by refusing nutrition and hydration.
26 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 June 26, 1997.
27 Vacco v. Quill 526 U.S. 793 June 26, 1997. 
28 Bush v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1086 (2005).
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The court determined that she would not wish to continue life-prolonging measures, 
and on April 24, 2001, her feeding tube was removed for the first time, only to be 
reinserted several days later. On 2001 five doctors examined Terri Schiavo’s medical 
records, brain scans, the videos, and Terri herself. They concluded that she was in a 
persistent vegetative state. On February 25, 2005, a Pinellas County judge ordered 
the removal of Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube. Several appeals and federal government 
intervention followed, which included U.S. President George W. Bush returning to 
Washington D.C. to sign legislation designed to keep her alive. After all attempts at 
appeals through the federal court system upheld the original decision to remove the 
feeding tube, staff at the Pinellas Park hospice facility where Terri was being cared for 
disconnected the feeding tube on March 18, 2005, and she died on March 31, 2005.
2.2. European Court’s of Human Rights case law
Meanwhile, in Europe, most of the countries ban any form of euthanasia or assisted 
suicide.29 Assisted suicide is legal in Belgium30, Luxembourg31, the Netherlands32 
and Switzerland33. Fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals are protected in 
Europe by the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 2 of such 
29 Article 579 of the Italian Criminal Code provides: ‘Whoever causes the death of a person, with his 
consent, shall be punished with imprisonment from six to fifteen years. The aggravating circumstanc-
es set out in Article 61 do not apply. The provisions relating to murder apply if the offense is committed: 1) 
against a person under eighteen years of age; 2) against a mentally ill person, or that is in a state of mental 
deficiency, for another illness or abuse of alcoholic substances or drugs; 3) against a person whose con-
sent has been convicted by extorted by violence, threat or suggestion, or taken away by stealth.   
Article 216 of the German Criminal Code provides: ‘(1) If a person is induced to kill by the express and earnest request 
of the victim the penalty shall be imprisonment from six months to five years. (2) The attempt shall be punishable. 
Section 2 of United Kingdom’s Suicide Act of 1961 provides:   
‘Criminal liability for complicity in another’s suicide  
 (1)A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to commit 
suicide, shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years. (2) 
If on the trial of an indictment for murder or manslaughter it is proved that the accused aided, abetted, counselled 
or procured the suicide of the person in question, the jury may find him guilty of that offence. (3) The enactments 
mentioned in the first column of the First Schedule to this Act shall have effect subject to the amendments pro-
vided for in the second column (which preserve in relation to offences under this section the previous operation of 
those enactments in relation to murder or manslaughter). (4) … no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence 
under this section except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions’.
30 The Belgian parliament legalized euthanasia in late September 2002.
31 The country’s parliament passed a bill legalizing euthanasia on 20 February 2008 in the first reading with 30 of 
59 votes in favor. On 19 March 2009, the bill passed the second reading, making Luxembourg the third European 
Union country, after the Netherlands and Belgium, to decriminalize euthanasia.
32 The Netherlands legalized voluntary euthanasia in 2001.
33 Article 115 of the Swiss Criminal Code, in effect since 1942, provides: ‘Inciting and assisting suicide: Any person 
who for selfish motives incites or assists another to commit or attempt to commit suicide shall, if that other person 
thereafter commits or attempts to commit suicide, be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a 
monetary penalty’. Since the law provides that such acts are considered offences when committed due to selfish mo-
tives, other motives are allowed. In Switzerland assisted suicide is legal. Dignitas clinic offers assisted suicide to Swiss 
citizens and foreigners. Nevertheless, as the clinic’s policy provides: ‘In every case, for legal reasons, the patient must 
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Convention protects “everyone’s” right to ‘life’, where ‘life’ is understood as human 
life. Article 2 of the Convention requires that everyone’s ‘right to life’ be ‘protected 
by law’. Apart from the death penalty, it envisages only limited circumstances in 
which a person can be deprived of this right.34 Meanwhile Article 8 of this 
Convention protects everyone’s right to respect his private and family life.35 
The consistent emphasis in all the cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) has been the obligation of the state to protect life. The Court has 
not been persuaded that ‘the right to life’ guaranteed in Article 2 can be interpreted 
as involving a negative aspect. It is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of 
living or what a person chooses to do with his or her life. To the extent that these 
aspects are recognized as so fundamental to the human condition that they require 
protection from State interference, they may be reflected in the rights guaranteed by 
other Articles of the Convention, or in other international human rights 
instruments. Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as 
conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a 
right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the 
entitlement to choose death rather than life. According to the ECHR no right to 
die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public 
authority, can be derived from Article 2 of the Convention. It is confirmed in this 
view by the recent Recommendation 1418 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe.36
The 1984 case of X v. Germany37 concerned a prisoner who had gone on a hunger 
strike and who was forcibly fed by the authorities. X complained of this treatment, 
be able to undertake the last act – that is to swallow, to administer via the gastric tube or to open the valve of the 
intravenous access tube him or herself. If this is not possible, DIGNITAS is unfortunately unable to help’.
34 European Convention on Human Rights, art 2: ‘1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction 
of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) 
in defense of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a 
person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
35 ibid. art 8: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance 
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
36 Pretty v. The United Kingdom, App no 2346/02 (ECHR, 29 April 2002), pp 39-40.
37 X v. Germany (1984) 7 EHRR 152, pp 153-154 state: ‘In the opinion of the Commission forced feeding of 
a person does involve degrading elements which in certain circumstances may be regarded as prohibited by Art. 
3 of the Convention. Under the Convention the High Contracting Parties are, however, also obliged to secure to 
everyone the right to life as set out in Art. 2. Such an obligation should in certain circumstances call for positive 
action on the part of the Contracting Parties, in particular an active measure to save lives when the authorities have 
146
JAHR  Vol. 5  No. 9  2014
arguing that it constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 
of the Convention. However, he did not argue that, under the Convention, he had 
a right to choose to die by starving himself. The Commission dismissed the 
application. Even though the intervention of forced feeding was done by the 
authorities of the prison were X was held, and not by physicians, in its decision 
ECHR held that the authorities acted solely on the person’s best interest. The use of 
the ‘best interest’ in terminal cases could raise claims on the use or legalization of 
euthanasia. According to this decision of ECHR a healthy individual’s best interest 
is to live and enjoy38 life. Is a State acting on a terminal patient’s best interest when 
it/the State refuses to act against this patient’s wishes to help him give an end with 
dignity to his life?
Two more recent cases on the “right to die” were, Sanles Sanles v. Spain39 and Pretty 
v. the United Kingdom40. The first one concerned a man, Mr. Sampedro, who had 
been a tetraplegic since the age of twenty-five and who, from 1993, when he was 
about fifty, had tried to obtain recognition from the Spanish courts of what he 
claimed was his right to end his life, with the help of others (including, in particular, 
his doctor), without interference by the State. However, he died before the 
proceedings in Spain had come to an end, and the relative he appointed as successor 
to this claim, Mrs. Sanles Sanles, was held by the Spanish courts and by the 
European Court of Human Rights to have no standing in the matter, i.e., in the 
latter forum, not to be a “victim” of the alleged violation of the Convention. 
 In Pretty v. United Kingdom, Mrs. Pretty suffered from a progressive neuro-
degenerative disease. She was paralyzed from neck down and was fed from a feeding 
tube; however, her intellect and capacity to make decisions were unimpaired. She very 
strongly wished to be able to control how and when she died and thereby to be spared 
from the suffering and indignity that came with the disease. Although it was not a 
crime to commit suicide under English law, the applicant was prevented by her disease 
from taking such a step without assistance. It was however a crime to assist another to 
commit suicide (section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961). Intending to commit suicide 
with the assistance of her husband, she asked the Director of Public Prosecutions, in a 
letter written on her behalf, to give an undertaking not to prosecute her husband 
should he assist her to commit suicide in accordance with her wishes. Her request was 
taken the person in question into their custody.’ … ‘The Commission is satisfied that the authorities acted solely in 
the best interests of the applicant when choosing between either respect for the applicant’s will not to accept nour-
ishment of any kind and thereby incur the risk that he might be subject to lasting injuries or even die, or to take 
action with a view to securing his survival although such action might infringe the applicant’s human dignity…’
38 This could be disputed on the basis of the quality of life.
39 Sanles Sanles v. Spain, admissibility decision of 20 October 2000.
40 ibid. (n 36).
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not approved by any of the English courts so she presented her case to the European 
Court of Human Rights pretending a violation of Article 2- right to life and, according 
to her interpretation of this article, right to die were violated.
The Court accepted that Mrs. Pretty’s wish to ‘exercise her choice to avoid what she 
considered would be an undignified and distressing end to her life’ was covered by 
the concept of ‘personal autonomy’, and that the law preventing her from exercising 
this choice (by asking her husband for assistance, she being incapable of committing 
suicide unaided) thus constituted an ‘interference’ with Mrs. Pretty’s right to respect 
for private life as guaranteed under Article 8 § 1 of the Convention.
Recognition of the principle of ‘personal autonomy’ enabled the Court to address 
the issue at the heart of the case: whether this principle protected the right of 
mentally fit individuals to choose death (if needs be with the assistance of others), 
or whether ‘the principle of sanctity of life’ could be allowed to override such ‘self-
determination’. The Court held that it was ‘common ground [between the parties] 
that the restriction on assisted suicide in this case was imposed by law and in pursuit 
of the legitimate aim of safeguarding life and thereby protecting the rights of others.’ 
The only issue to be determined was therefore whether the interference was 
‘necessary in a democratic society.’41
On its decision the Court recalled the margin of appreciation accorded to the states 
on several issues. The Court was careful to stress that this ruling did not mean that if a 
particular State did recognize such a right (as did Switzerland, for instance), that 
would ipso facto be contrary to Article 2; nor did it mean that if a State that did 
recognize a right to take one’s own life were to be held to have acted in accordance 
with Article 2, that would imply that the applicant, too, should be granted that right.
In Haas v Switzerland42 the applicant lived in Switzerland, where assisted suicide is 
permitted. He had a long history of mental illness and wished to commit suicide. 
No doctor was willing to help him to do so. He complained about the refusal of the 
Swiss authorities to permit him to obtain lethal drugs, without a prescription, in a 
sufficient quantity to enable him to end his life in a dignified manner. He contended 
that the authorities thereby violated his right under article 8 to decide when and 
how to end his life. The court held that there was no violation. 
The court accepted that the right of an individual to decide how and when to end 
his life, provided that he is in a position to make up his own mind in that respect, is 
41 Human rights handbooks, No. 8, p 21; <http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/50/50_HRHandbooks> accessed 28.02.2013. 
42 Haas v. Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33.
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one aspect of the right to respect for private life within the meaning of article 8.43 
The question whether there has been a violation depends on article 8(2). According 
to the court: ‘The Convention and the Protocols thereto must be interpreted in the 
light of the present-day conditions…In Switzerland, under art 115 of the Criminal 
Code, incitement to commit or assistance with suicide are only punishable where 
the perpetrator of such acts commits them for selfish motives. By comparison, the 
Benelux countries in particular have decriminalized the act of assisting suicide, but 
only in well-defined circumstances. Certain other countries only allow “passive” acts 
of assistance. The vast majority of Member States, however, appear to place more 
weight on the protection of an individual’s life than on the right to end one’s life. 
The Court concludes that the states have a wide margin of appreciation in that 
respect.’44 
2.3. United Kingdom (UK) case law
In the UK any form of assisted suicide or euthanasia is banned under The UK 
Suicide Act of 1961.45 Even though there are many cases presented to the English 
courts on assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia, the Courts have stated that 
these are not matters for them to decide but for the Parliament. Today these changes 
have still not been made.
In 1993 English courts were faced with a decision in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.46 
The case concerned Anthony David “Tony” Bland born on 21st September 1970. 
He was injured in the Hillsborough disaster, named after the football stadium where 
95 people died and many others were injured, as a result of thousands of fans being 
pushed and crushed against steel fencing, installed to prevent hooliganism. Tony 
suffered severe injuries and he stopped breathing. His brain was deprived of oxygen, 
and by the time breathing was restored his upper brain had been severely damaged, 
leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. Tony Bland was neither dead nor dying. 
His brain stem still functioned; he could breathe and digest food normally. He was 
fed by a nasogastric tube, and evacuated by catheter and enema. Both his doctor 
and his parents wanted to stop assisted feeding and all medical treatment so that he 
would die. Three years later the Airedale Hospital Trust made an application to the 
High Court, supported by amicus curiae instructed by the Attorney General, and 
opposed by the Official Solicitor, whose role was to represent Tony Bland’s interests.
43 ibid.  pp 51.
44 ibid. pp 55.
45 ibid. (n 29).
46 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 ALL ER 821.
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Sir Stephen Brown, President of the Family Division of the High Court, granted 
such request to the Hospital. In his summing up he held that ‘to his parents and 
family [Tony Bland] is dead. His spirit has left him and all that remains is the shell 
of his body.’47 His decision was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords, the UK’s highest point of legal appeal. Its findings and 
assumptions in the Bland case included that the whole purpose of withdrawing 
food, fluids and medicines was to end his life, that this was not authorizing 
euthanasia and that Tony Bland’s existence in PVS was not a benefit to him. 
Another particular case of assisted suicide in UK, where consent was given by the 
patient, was the case of Daniel James. Daniel was a rugby player injured in a training 
session in 2007, paralyzed from the chest down and with no independent hand or 
finger movement. The impact of his injuries on Daniel was profound. In the early 
months he gave his all to prove the medical prognosis incorrect, but ultimately he 
came to accept that his condition would never improve. He became suicidal, driven 
by distress at his predicament and his dependency on others. To his consultant 
psychiatrist, he described himself as a ‘dynamic, active, sporty young man who loved 
travel and being independent’ and that ‘he could not envisage a worthwhile future 
for himself now’. Daniel frequently stated his wish that he had died of his injuries 
on the rugby field and that he was determined to end his own life. He made several 
attempts to do so. Daniel was assessed by a Consultant Psychiatrist on a number of 
occasions. His parents had stated that they had come to accept his wish to die. 
Daniel planned his death at the Dignitas Clinic in Switzerland with the help of his 
parents and a close friend. On 12 September 2008 he attended the clinic with his 
parents where a doctor helped him to take his own life. Although Daniel James’ 
parents and his friend played some part in the co-ordination of the arrangements, 
The Crown Prosecution decided that they were not ‘ringleaders’ or ‘organizers’ in 
the sense did not mean the Code for Crown Prosecutors; nor was the offence 
premeditated or a ‘group ’offence.48
Another similar case on assisted suicide in UK was the case of Debbie Purdy49. Ms 
Purdy was terminally ill with multiple sclerosis and wanted the Crown Prosecution 
Service to clarify whether or not an individual could assist someone to travel to 
another country where assisted suicide is legal and not be prosecuted on return to 
the UK. Ms Purdy contended that the assisted suicide prohibition in the 1961 
Suicide Act constituted an interference with her rights, within the context of her 
47 ibid., Sir Stephen Brown’s summing up.
48 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/death_by_suicide_of_daniel_james/> [accessed  22.06.2012].
49 R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] 1 AC 345.
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private life, under article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).50 Purdy argued that she had a right to decide to kill herself and that this 
right was infringed upon by the prohibitions set out in the 1961 Suicide Act.
All five Law Lords agreed that the right to respect for private life in Article 8(1) of 
ECHR was engaged in the case brought by Ms Purdy. Furthermore, they concluded 
that the assisted suicide prohibition in the 1961 Suicide Act did constitute an 
interference with that right, because the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for 
England and Wales had failed to provide an offence-specific prosecution policy for 
assisted suicide. Owing to the absence of an appropriate policy, such interference 
violated Article 8(2) of the Convention and in so doing was not in “accordance with 
the law”. Thus, people such as Ms Purdy lacked the necessary information to inform 
their decision about their private lives and counter any challenge mounted by the 
DPP and Crown Prosecutors “in deciding under section 2(4) of the 1961 Act 
whether or not it is in the public interest to bring a prosecution under that section”. 
The law lords also ruled that changes in the law on assisted suicide could only be 
decided upon by Parliament.51
A recent case on assisted suicide was the case of Tony Nicklinson and Martin v 
Ministry of Justice.52 The claimants suffered from catastrophic physical disabilities 
but their mental processes were unimpaired in the sense that they were fully 
conscious of their predicament. They suffered from ‘locked in syndrome’. Both had 
determined that they wished to die with dignity and without further suffering but 
their condition made them incapable of ending their own lives. Neither was 
terminally ill and they faced the prospect of living for many years. Neither Martin’s 
nor Tony’s condition was capable of physical improvement. 
Martin suffered a brain stem stroke in August 2008 which left him virtually unable 
to move. He could not speak. He could communicate only through small 
movements of his head and eyes and, very slowly, by using a special computer that 
detected where on a screen he was looking. He was totally dependent on others for 
every aspect of his life. He was fed by people putting food into his mouth. He was 
able to swallow. His medication went through a tube through his abdominal wall 
into his stomach. Martin was capable of physically assisted suicide, but this involved 
someone else committing an offence under the Suicide Act 1961, section It was 
possible for him to end his life at a Dignitas clinic in Zurich without an offence 
50 European Convention on Human Rights, art 8(1): ‘Right to respect for private and family life. 1. Everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’ 
51 < http://www.care.org.uk/advocacy/end-of-life/what-about-the-case-of-debbie-purdy> [accessed 22.06.2012].
52 Tony Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 (Admin), Case No: CO/7774/2010; CO/7850/2011.
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being committed under Swiss law; and if Martin’s wife were willing to help him to 
do so, it was unlikely that she would have faced prosecution in England under the 
policy published by the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) about prosecution for 
assisted suicide after the decision of the House of Lords in R (Purdy) v DPP. But 
Martin’s wife, who herself was a nurse and devoted to his care, was understandably 
not willing to support Martin for that purpose, with which she did not agree, 
although she wished to be with him to provide comfort and make her final farewell, 
if he were to succeed in his purpose by the help of others. 
Tony suffered a catastrophic stroke in June 2005. He is paralysed below the neck 
and unable to speak. He cannot move anything but his head and eyes. He 
communicates by blinking to indicate a letter held up by his wife on a Perspex 
board. He also now has an eye blink computer which makes word processing faster 
for him. he only way in which Tony could end his life other than by self-starvation 
would be by voluntary euthanasia. With his wife’s help he could probably travel to 
Switzerland, but that would not help him because euthanasia is outside the scope of 
Dignitas’ activities. 
According to a statement by a doctor53, it would have been technologically possible 
for Tony to take the final step of initiating suicide with the aid of a machine that 
had been invented. The machine would be pre-loaded with lethal drugs and could 
be digitally activated by Tony using an appropriate pass phrase, but it would be an 
elaborate procedure requiring the machine to be set up, tested and connected to 
Tony’s PEG tube, but Tony wanted to be able to choose to end his life by voluntary 
euthanasia.  
In its decision regarded the case the Court concluded: ‘…A decision to allow their 
claims would have consequences far beyond the present cases. …It is not for the 
court to decide whether the law about assisted dying should be changed and, if so, 
what safeguards should be put in place. Under our system of government these are 
matters for Parliament to decide, representing society as a whole, after Parliamentary 
scrutiny, and not for the court on the facts of an individual case or cases. For those 
reasons I would refuse these applications for judicial review.’54 ‘Each case gives rise 
to most profound ethical, moral, religious and social issues. Some will say the Judges 
must step in to change the law. Some may be sorely tempted to do so. But the short 
answer is that to do so here would be to usurp the function of Parliament in this 
53 Dr Philip Nitschke, who is a doctor in North Australia.
54 ibid. (n 52) pp 150.
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classically sensitive area. Any change would need the most carefully structured 
safeguards which only Parliament can deliver.’55 
2.4. Albanian case law on the right to die
In Albania, the Constitution protects the right to life and health care.56 According 
to the Constitution the protection of life is an important constitutional requirement. 
The concepts of life and dignity are important constitutional values considered as 
the source of all other fundamental rights and freedoms. The individual and his life 
are of superior value for the state. 
Regarding individual’s right to die, in Albania both forms of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are banned and considered a criminal offence. The problem consists in the 
fact that this is not literally provided by law, but it is through the interpretation of 
laws that such actions are considered criminal offences. 
In Albania, patients’ rights are guaranteed and protected by the Constitution, The 
European Convention on Human Rights57, law ‘On health care in the Republic of 
Albania’58; law ‘On public health’59; law ‘On the regulated professions in the 
Republic of Albania’ (the part that provides duties and obligations for the health 
care professionals)60 and The Ethical Code on Medical Deontology61. 
Albania’s Criminal Code provides criminal acts against health due to negligence.62 
None of these articles provides limitations on the right to die or euthanasia. It is 
only through the interpretation of law ‘On health care in the Republic of Albania’ 
55 ibid. pp 151.
56 The Constitution of the Republic of Albania, art 21: ‘Individual’s life is protected by law’; art. 55/1: ‘Citizens 
enjoy equal right to health care’. 
57 ibid. art 116/1/b: ‘Normative acts that are effective in the entire territory of the Republic of Albania are: … b. 
ratified international agreements …’.
58 Law no 10107, dated 30.03.2009 ‘On health care in the Republic of Albania’.
59 Law no 10138, dated 11.05.2009 ‘On public health’.
60 Law no 10171, dated 22.10.2009 ‘On the regulated professions in the Republic of Albania’.
61 Albanian Code of Ethics and Medical Deontology, adopted by Decision nr.9, dated 11.11.2011 of the Na-
tional Council of the Albanian Order of Medics.
62 Albanian Criminal Code, section IV. Article 91 of this Code provides: ‘Serious injury due to negligence con-
stitutes criminal contravention and is punishable by fine or imprisonment up to one year’. Article 96 provides: 
‘Incorrect medication of patients from the doctor or other medical staff, as well as non-implementation of the 
therapy or the orders of the doctor from the medical staff or pharmacist, when it has caused serious harm to the 
health, has endangered the life of the person or has caused his death, is punishable by a fine or up to five years of 
imprisonment. This very act, when it has caused the patients’ infection with HIV/AIDS, is punished by impris-
onment from 3 to 7 years’. Meanwhile, Article 97 provides: ‘Refraining from providing help without reasonable 
cause by the person who either legally or because of his capacity was obliged to provide, is considered criminal 
contravention and is punishable by a fine or to up to two years of imprisonment when, as its consequence, serious 
harm to the health, endangerment to life or death resulted.’
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and the Albanian Code of Ethics and Medical Deontology that euthanasia is 
considered as a criminal offence. 
The law ‘On health care in the Republic of Albania’ provides that, for the safeguard 
of the ethical rules and medical deontology by the health care professionals, 
Professional Orders are created.63 Professional Orders’ duties and activities are 
provided by their respective laws.64 Such laws provide the duty of the physicians to 
apply the Code of Ethics and Medical Deontology. 
Meanwhile, such Code provides that relief of suffering and pain is one of the 
fundamental duties of the physician towards its patient. This is particularly 
important while treating a dying patient. The physician, except treating the patient, 
must also offer spiritual assistance and care, in respect of patient’s wishes and 
religious beliefs, safeguarding his dignity until the end of his life. The physician 
must inform the family of the patient on his condition and try to get their 
cooperation in relieving the suffering of the sick.65 
Acceleration of the end of life or death provocation is contrary to medical ethics. If 
the patient is unconscious, with no hope to live, the doctor must act according to 
his judgment in patient’s best interest. The physician must decide on the therapeutic 
actions he will undertake, after consulting his colleagues and patient’s closest family 
members.66
As noted, the Albanian Code of Medical Ethics and Deontology allows a margin of 
appreciation regarding euthanasia, stressing the importance of patient’s dignity and 
best interest, while prohibiting any form of acceleration of end of life or provocation 
of death.
In the Albanian jurisprudence there are neither cases of active or passive euthanasia, 
nor of assisted suicide. Not only there are no such cases, but there is an immediate 
need for the Parliament to regulate the activity of physicians on such cases. The state 
must also take the necessary steps to inform not only patients on their rights on 
medical care, but also the physicians on their rights and duties. 
Even to the questionnaire prepared by the European Health Committee, followed 
and assembled by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which led 
to Recommendation 1418 (1999) ‘Protection of the human rights and dignity of 
63 ibid. (n 58), art 32/1. 
64 law no 8615, dated 1. 06. 2000 ‘On the Order of the Physicians in the Republic of Albania’; law no 9718, dated 
19.4.2007 ‘On the Order of the Nurse in the Republic of Albania”; law no 9150, dated 30.10.2003 ‘On the Order 
of the Pharmacists in the Republic of Albania’. 
65 ibid (n 61), art 38 ‘Relief of suffering of the dying patient’.
66 ibid. art.39 ‘Non acceleration of death’.
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the terminally ill and the dying’,67 Albania answered that there was no law on 
euthanasia, that the term was not included in the Albanian Criminal Code therefore 
there were no sanctions against it, that the only provisions on the Albanian Criminal 
Code could be found on the chapter ‘On offences against life and health’ and that 
the activity of the physician was provided only in the Albanian Code of Ethics and 
Medical Deontology.68 
  The activities of Albanian physicians in end of life cases today aren’t still regulated 
neither by law, nor by decision of the executive power, or any other regulation.69 
Other Albanian researchers have also suggested the immediate need for such 
legislative regulations.70 
The legislative reform should be coupled with a program to promote the 
understanding and use of procedures on end of life or terminally ill patients 
amongst the general public and the legal and medical professions. The patients must 
have greater access to information about their rights regarding medical treatment. 
The physicians must understand and apply not only the law but they should 
understand also the consequences they’re faced with if they do not obey the laws in 
force regarding medical care. Patient’s dignity and best interest should be protected, 
as should patient’s health and life.
Conclusions 
The involvement of the medical profession in everyone’s lives makes the 
understanding of the law governing the medical profession extremely important. It 
is certain that at some point in our lives we are forced to rely upon the medical 
profession. The almost certain involvement of the medical profession in achieving 
good health makes the laws governing the medical profession and the rights of the 
patients vitally important. 
Obviously the right to life is fundamental in our scheme of values. Such right, 
considered as the center stone of all individual rights and freedoms describes the 
belief that a human being has an essential right to live, particularly that a human 
being has the right not to be killed by another human being. Nevertheless, the 
interest in the preservation of human life is not itself sufficient to outweigh the 
67 < http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta99/EREC1418.htm> accessed 28.02.2013.
68 Danja Sinani ‘Përkufizimi juridik i vdekjes’ (Naimi: Tirana, 1st edn, 2012) p. 116-117.
69 This conclusion was achieved after having enquired at the legal department of Mother Teresa University Hos-
pital, the office of statistics of Mother Teresa University Hospital, the web-site of the Albanian Ministry of Health, 
The Order of Albanian Doctors ad after having questioned Albanian doctors.
70 Danja Sinani ‘Përkufizimi juridik i vdekjes’ (‘Naimi’ Publication 2012) p. 161.
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interest in liberty that may justify the only possible means of preserving a dying 
patient’s dignity and alleviating her intolerable suffering.71
The right of the patient to die today should be considered in the light of the changes 
society is going through and of new approach towards human rights.
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